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The district court adopted an earlier ruling by a magistrate judge that, in turn, reli�d on a pocket 
edition of Black's Law Dictionary to define an "award" as "an agreement granted by a formal process." 
The district court concluded that the Ochoa settlement constituted an "award" and that therefore Home 
was not entitled to share in it under the terms of the Home-Pan American settlement agreement. The 
Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the term "award" and noted that 
under Puerto Rican law, if the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous concerning the intentions 
of the parties then the literal sense of the stipulations will be observed. The Court of Appeals held that 
there was no ambiguity over the meaning of"award," and therefore the district court's interpretation was 
incorrect in that it went beyond the meaning of the word as generally used in legal writing, and as used 
in the Home-Pan American settlement in particular, by mischaracterizing voluntary settlement 
negotiation between parties as a "formal process." 
Furthermore, the Court found it difficult to believe that two parties as sophisticated as Home and 
Pan American, represented by counsel, would not have used the term "settlement" in place of"award" if 
they had intended to exclude negotiated settlements from their settlement agreement. The Court noted 
that a paragraph of the settlement agreement mentioned both "awards" and "settlements" when 
describing various recoveries but specifically omitted "settlement" from the description of recoveries 
relating to punitive damages and/or loss of use. According to the Court, this strongly suggested that the 
parties recognized that an "award" and a "verdict" did not incorporate a "settlement." 
The Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in determining that the Ochoa settlement 
was excluded from the Home-Pan American settlement because it was for "loss of use" of the Zorra. 
The Court found that language in the Ochoa settlement stated explicitly that the $800,000 was being 
paid in consideration not only for Ochoa's release from claims of loss of use, but also for release from 
all possible future claims. Thus, because the Ochoa settlement settled multiple claims, it was not 
excluded under the Home and Pan American agreement. 
The Court held that the district court erred in not finding that Pan American breached its 
settlement agreement with Home when it did not notify Home of the Ochoa settlement prior to entering 
into it, and when it refused to share the recovery proceeds with Home in the manner specified by the 
settlement agreement. 
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ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS OF CRUISE LINE 
CREWMEMBERS ENFORCED PURSUANT TO U.N. CONVENTION 
The seamen employment contract exemption contained within the Federal Arbitration Act did not 
allow crewmembers to circumvent submitting to arbitration under Philippine jurisdiction with 
respect to claims arising from an onboard accident, when arbitration was compelled by the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
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Six crewmembers of the cruise ship S/S Norway were killed when the vessel's boiler exploded 
on May 25, 2003 while docked in Miami; four crewmembers were injured. Plaintiffs, injured 
crewmembers and representatives of the decedents, filed ten separate suits in a Florida circuit court 
against defendants Star Cruises and Norwegian Cruise Line ("NC L"), seeking damages for negligence 
and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. NCL removed the cases to federal district 
court pursuant to § 205 of 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 ( the "Convention Act") which implemented the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the 
"Convention"), permitting removal prior to trial in disputes relating to an arbitration agreement or award 
covered by the Convention. 
The crewmembers' employment contracts contained clauses that required arbitration in cases of 
claims and disputes arising from a seaman's employment. The contracts were executed in the 
Philippines, and their form and content was regulated by a Philippine administrative agency, the 
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. The district court granted NC L's motion to compel 
arbitration in the Philippines and denied plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The court retained 
jurisdiction to enforce or confirm and resulting arbitral award. 
Plaintiffs challenged the district court's jurisdiction by claiming that the case was not covered by 
the Convention. The Court of Appeals noted that a district court must order arbitration unless I )  the four 
jurisdictional prerequisites are not met or 2) one of the Convention's affirmative defenses applies. 
DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. ' PLC, 202 F. 3d 71 ( I  st Cir. 2000). The four prerequisites require that 
I )  there is an agreement in writing within the meaning of the Convention; 2) the agreement provides for 
arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; 3) the agreement arises out of a legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial; and 4) a party to the 
agreement is not an American citizen, or that the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation 
with one or more foreign states. Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440 ( 3d Cir. 2003). 
The court, finding the second and fourth conditions fulfilled, turned to an analysis of the first and third 
conditions, observing that the Convention established a strong presumption in favor of arbitrating 
international commercial disputes. Despite language in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA"), providing that " . . .  nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of 
seamen . . .  ," the Court of Appeals held that the exemption's application outside the FAA was restricted 
by the second and third chapters of title 9. The court stated that Congress gave the treaty-implementing 
statutes primacy over the FAA, with the provisions of the latter applying only where they did not 
conflict. The court viewed this hierarchical structure as consistent with the premise that the Convention 
trumped prior inconsistent rules of law, in keeping with an exercise of Congress' treaty power and 
federal law. The court continued its analysis by engaging in a lengthy technical dissection of§§ 202 and 
208 of the Convention before arriving at the conclusion that the arbitration provisions were commercial 
legal relationships under the Convention, regardless of the FAA exemption. 
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' affirmative defenses - that the arbitration 
provision was unconscionable and that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable - failed and that the 
district court had properly granted NC L's motion to compel arbitration. 
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